Group Membership On Perceived Fairness Transgressions

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Fairness Transgressions & Group Membership

- *How does group membership shape perceived fairness transgressions?*

- When **fairness transgressions** are presented, regardless of whether they have been directly harmed by norm violation, people are willing to incur costs and reap no economic benefit to sanction the behavior[1]

- **Perspectives** on a transgression may bias how people assess fairness violations and subsequently affect their preferences for justice restoration[2]

- When individuals are forced to allocate resources as they see fit, their equitable offers sometimes vary as a function of **group membership**[3], such that individuals tend to favor ingroup over outgroup members, even at the expense of personal financial cost[4]

- Examining data through mixed effects logistic regression, we anticipate that participants' responses will vary based on fairness level, and more importantly –

1. Participants will be more punitive when transgressors are outgroup members

2. This tendency will appear more salient with a more diverse and representative victim pool

3. Punitive tendency will also be enhanced under the condition of resource scarcity

## Study 1 – Do Sanctions Vary for the Self, Black, and White Victims?

n = 478 participants
Black and White victims for player C trials

- Compensate more than punish

- Compensate more as offers become fairer and punish more as offers become unfair, $t(474) = -4.395$, $p < .001$

- Significant interaction between fairness level and perspective, $t(474) = 2.367$, $p = .0179$
  - Punish more on behalf of *self*, compared with *others*
  - *No difference as a function of the race of the victim*

Third-Party Modified Ultimatum Game

Scenario 1: You are Player B

Scenario 2: You are Player C

Player A → Player B: YOU

Player A → Player B → Player C: YOU

- Participants witnessed a proposer split a financial endowment with a recipient who varied in race

- Varying levels of unfairness, from moderately unfair ($0.60/$0.40) to highly unfair ($0.90/$0.10)

- Three different choices of response: accept, reverse, compensate[2]:
1. Reverse: philosophy of retributive justice has been operationalized in our task by reversing the Players' outcomes that allows for the maximum punishment to be applied to the proposer while also gives the maximum compensation to the recipient
2. Compensate: a newly developed social preferences for equitable and efficient outcomes where participants could increase the victim's monetary payout without decreasing the proposer's payout
3. Accept: a classic response reflecting the agreement to receive a smaller amount relative to what the proposer apportions for him or herself

Study 2 – Do Sanctions Vary for the Self and More Diverse Victims?

n = 482 participants
Black, White, Asian and Latino victims for player C trials

With a more diverse sample of victims
1. Compensate more than punish
2. Replicate fairness effect, $t(478) = 4.506$, $p < .001$
   - Compensate more as offers become more fair
   - Punish more as offers become unfair
3. No interaction between fairness level and perspective for diverse sample of victims, $t(478) = -.316$, $p = .752$ (Self = Others and White = Black)

Scarcity Manipulation

Scarcity: You have been randomly selected to receive $10

Control: You have been randomly selected to receive $10

Study 3 - Study 3 - Do Sanctions Vary for Diverse Victims Under Conditions of Scarcity?

n = 972 participants
Black, White, Asian, and Latino Victims for player C trials with scarcity manipulation

Scarcity:

Control:

With a more diverse sample of victims under conditions of scarcity
1. Compensate more than punish
2. Replicate fairness effect, $t(968) = 7.187$, $p < .001$
   - Compensate more as offers become fairer
   - Punish more as offers become unfair
3. No interaction between fairness level and perspective for diverse sample of victims, $t(968) = 1.129$, $p = .259$, (Self = Others and White = Black)
4. Effects are not moderated by scarcity, $t(967) = .460$, $p = .646$

Conclusions

1. With increasing unfairness, individuals became more sensitive to fairness transgressions and punitive
2. The racial diversity of the victims did not change this tendency, only fairness effect persist
3. Conditions of scarcity also did not change this tendency, only fairness effect persist

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